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SECOND DEPARTMENT
198
Ansorian v. Zimmerman

(decided May 22, 1995)

Rosette Ansorian, the plaintiff and a high school French
teacher, appealed an order granting summary judgment by the
Supreme Court, Rockland County, based on her claim that
defendant's written and oral statements concerning her
constituted defamation and were not protected under either the
free speech provisions of the New York State 199 and Federal 200
Constitutions. 20 1 The court denied the plaintiff's constitutional
claim and held that the communications were not defamatory,
but, instead, "constituted personal opinion and rhetorical
hyperbole rather than objective fact." 202 The court explained that
"[p]ure opinion is defined as a statement of opinion which is
accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon which it is based or
does not imply that it is based upon undisclosed facts." 203
Rosette Ansorian was the defendant, Vanessa Zimmerman's,
high school French teacher. 204 Mark and Sandra Zimmerman,
Vanessa's parents, made written and oral statements in which
they declared Ansorian "incompetent" and requested that she be
replaced as Vanessa's French teacher. 205
Rosette Ansorian sued the defendants for defamation and
argued that the Zimmerman's oral and written statements, where
they called Ansorian "incompetent" and requested her dismissal,
198. 215 A.D.2d 614, 627 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1995).
199. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." Id.
201. Ansorian, 215 A.D.2d at 614, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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were not constitutionally protected free speech. 206 The court held
that the alleged defamatory material constituted opinion rather
than an assertion of objective fact, and, therefore, was
20 7
constitutionally protected free speech.
In reaching its decision, the court sought support from Immuno
A. G. v. Moor-Jankowski,208 which set forth the New York test to
determine whether an alleged defamatory statement constitutes an
assertion of objective fact which subjects a defendant to liability.
In discussing whether an alleged defamatory statement constitutes
an assertion of objective fact, the Immuno court stated:
In making this inquiry, courts cannot stop at literalism. The
literal words of challenged statements do not entitle a media
defendant to "opinion" imnmunity or a libel plaintiff to go
forward with its action. In determining whether speech is
actionable, courts must additionally consider the impression
created by the words used as well as the general tenor of the
expression, from the point of view of the reasonable person. 20 9

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). In Immuno, a libel action was brought against
the editor of a scientific journal which published a letter to the editor that
criticized a biologic products manufacturer's plan to establish an African
facility for hepatitis research using wild chimpanzees. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d
at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The letter criticized the facility by stating that
the facility was (1) created to avoid restrictions upon the importation of
chimpanzees, (2) harmful to the population of chimpanzees because the capture
of such animals required killing the chimpanzees' mothers and (3) capable of
spreading hepatitis back to the healthy chimpanzee population. Id. The
defendant also described the plaintiff's alleged attempts to avoid regulations on
endangered species "scientific imperialism" and stated that such actions would
"backfire on people like [the defendant) involved in the bona fide use of
chimpanzees and other primate animals." Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 909. The Immuno court held that the letter in question "would not
have been viewed by the average reader.., as conveying actual facts about
plaintiff," and, therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment order. Id.
at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
209. Id. at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1274, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
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The Ansorian court adopted the language of Immuno and stated

that expressions which constitute opinion are constitutionally
2 10

protected.
Further, in Steinhilber v. Alphonse,2 11 the New York Court of

Appeals defined constitutionally protected pure opinion as "a
statement of opinion which is accompanied by a recitation of the
facts upon which it is based ....-212 The court stated that "[ain
opinion not accompanied by such a factual recitation may,
nevertheless, be 'pure opinion' if it does not imply that it is based
2 13

upon undisclosed facts."
Applying both of the above principles, the Ansorian court
concluded that the oral and written statements made by the

defendants were supported by a recitation of the underlying facts,

and therefore, were constitutionally protected. 2 14
According to the Ansorian court, under the New York State

Constitution, expressions of opinion are given greater protection
than under the United States Constitution. 2 15 New York provides
a "hospitable climate for the free exchange of ideas." ' 216 The

words of article I, section 8, of the New York State Constitution
"reflect

the

deliberate

choice

of the

New

York

State

Constitutional Convention not to follow the language of the First
210. Ansorian, 215 A.D.2d at 614, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
211. 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986). In
Steinhilber, a former union member brought a defamation action against the
union for an allegedly defamatory recorded telephone message which stated in
pertinent part "[plaintiff] lacks only three things to get ahead, talent, ambition,
and initiative," and for an allegedly defamatory banner which said "# 1 SCAB
LOUISE STEINHILBER SUCKS." Id. at 287-88, 501 N.E.2d at 551, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 902. The court held that the telephone answering message would
not be understood by the reasonable person to be "an assertion of fact or as
[an] opinion based on undisclosed facts." Id. at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 906. The court reasoned that the banner, in its context, was
intended to be "an expression of disapproval" and was, therefore, a nonactionable opinion. Id. at 295, 501 N.E.2d at 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
212. Id. at 289, 501 N.E.2d at 552, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
213. Id.
214. Ansorian, 215 A.D.2d at 614, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
215. Id.
216. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249, 567 N.E.2d
1270, 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913 (1991).
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Amendment [of the Federal Constitution], ratified 30 years
earlier, but instead to set forth [New York State's] basic
democratic ideal of liberty of the press in strong affirmative
terms." 2 17 Therefore, whether the "interpretive" 2 18 or "noninterpretive" 219 approach of constitutional analysis is applied to

the New York State Constitution, the state's free speech
provision affords broader protection than the Federal
Constitution. 220

In analyzing free speech cases under the New York State
Constitution, there is no single formula or definitive
procedure. 22 1 Thus, in the context of defining opinion for the
purposes of adjudicating claims of free expression, "[t]he
essential task is to decide whether the words complained of,
considered in the context of the entire communication and of the
circumstances in which they were spoken or written, may be
reasonably understood as implying the assertion of undisclosed

facts justifying the opinion." 222 Thus, even if the actual words of
a communication appear to be defamatory, they may still be
constitutionally protected in New York if the reasonable person
would not interpret the words to be an assertion of fact, based on
the circumstances surrounding the communication.
The federal courts analyze the type of communication
necessary for a valid defamation action differently than the New
York courts. Generally, the federal courts have relied on the
217. Id.
218. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (defining the
interpretive approach as emphasizing text and history).
219. Id. (defining the non-interpretive approach as emphasizing tradition
and policy).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 251, 567 N.E.2d at 1279, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
222. Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d. 283, 290, 501 N.E.2d 550, 553,
508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1986). In applying this analysis, the court held that
the union head's allegedly defamatory words regarding the plaintiff's lack of
"talent, ambition and initiative" were constitutionally protected under New
York State's free speech provision because, under the circumstances of the
plaintiff crossing her union's strike line, the ordinary person would not
consider the statements to be "an assertion of fact or... opinion based on
undisclosed facts." Id. at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
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following four part test illustrated in Olman v. Evans. 223 Under
the Oilman test, the court should consider:
1) an assessment of whether the specific language in issue has a
precise meaning which is readily understood or whether it is
indefinite and ambiguous; (2) a determination of whether the
statement is capable of being objectively characterized as true or
false; (3) an examination of the full context of the communication
in which the statement appears; and (4) a consideration of the
broader social context or setting surrounding the communication
including the existence of any applicable customs or conventions
which might "signal to readers or listeners that what is being
224
read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."
Though the last two factors of the test envisioned by the
plurality in Olman seem to parallel New York State's propensity
to view the entire statement in relation to the surrounding
circumstances, the federal courts have combined the last two
factors into one termed "type of speech."225 From this
viewpoint, "except for special situations of loose, figurative,
hyperbolic language, statements that contain or imply assertions
of provably false fact will likely be actionable." '226 Because the
federal courts apply the second and third elements of their
general test in such a way, communications which might not be
actionable under the New York State analysis, due to their
surrounding circumstances, will likely be actionable in federal
court because the federal courts will only except loose,
figurative, hyperbolic language from liability.

223. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
224. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 292, 501 N.E.2d at 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
905 (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
225. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 244, 567 N.E.2d at 1274, 566 N.Y.S.2d at

910.
226. Id. at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911. See Milkovich

v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (holding that defendant
newspaper's assertion that the plaintiff had lied under oath "is not the sort of
loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression
that the writer was seriously maintaining that [plaintiff] committed the crime of
perjury").
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Undoubtedly, there are many situations where allegedly
defamatory communication is not made in a loose, figurative or
hyperbolic way, but the surrounding circumstances of the
communication would dictate to the average person that such
communication is only an opinion and should not be taken as an
assertion of fact. The Immuno court did not stop at the
application of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., but went ahead
and stated that the federal court's policy of "[i]solating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they
were uttered, indeed may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context." 227
In sum, in our system of federalism, the Federal Constitution
provides the minimum of free speech protection. Since the
federal courts will look to classify the communication by type
rather than on the circumstances and context surrounding the
communication, more allegedly slanderous and libelous
statements will not be constitutionally protected under the Federal
Constitution. Therefore, the New York State Constitution goes
further than the Federal Constitution in protecting free speech.
The New York courts will look at allegedly defamatory material
from the reasonable person standard based on the
communication's surrounding circumstances.
Guarneri v. Korea News, Inc. 2 2 8
(decided April 17, 1995)
Attorney Stephen Guarneri brought a libel action against the
newspapers Korea News, Inc. and Korea Central Daily News,
Inc., based on statements printed in their respective newspapers
about Mr. Guarneri's conduct as an attorney in a criminal
case. 22 9 The defendants separately appealed from an order
227. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
917.
228. 625 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
229. Id. at 292.
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